PENSÉES
by Blaise Pascal
1660
translated by W. F. Trotter
SECTION I: THOUGHTS ON MIND AND ON STYLE
1. The difference between the mathematical and the intuitive mind.--In
the one, the principles are palpable, but removed from ordinary use;
so that for want of habit it is difficult to turn one's mind in that
direction: but if one turns it thither ever so little, one sees the
principles fully, and one must have a quite inaccurate mind who
reasons wrongly from principles so plain that it is almost impossible
they should escape notice.
But in the intuitive mind the principles are found in common use and
are before the eyes of everybody. One has only to look, and no effort
is necessary; it is only a question of good eyesight, but it must be
good, for the principles are so subtle and so numerous that it is
almost impossible but that some escape notice. Now the omission of one
principle leads to error; thus one must have very clear sight to see
all the principles and, in the next place, an accurate mind not to
draw false deductions from known principles.
All mathematicians would then be intuitive if they had clear sight,
for they do not reason incorrectly from principles known to them; and
intuitive minds would be mathematical if they could turn their eyes to
the principles of mathematics to which they are unused.
The reason, therefore, that some intuitive minds are not mathematical
is that they cannot at all turn their attention to the principles of
mathematics. But the reason that mathematicians are not intuitive is
that they do not see what is before them, and that, accustomed to the
exact and plain principles of mathematics, and not reasoning till they
have well inspected and arranged their principles, they are lost in
matters of intuition where the principles do not allow of such
arrangement. They are scarcely seen; they are felt rather than seen;
there is the greatest difficulty in making them felt by those who do
not of themselves perceive them. These principles are so fine and so
numerous that a very delicate and very clear sense is needed to
perceive them, and to judge rightly and justly when they are
perceived, without for the most part being able to demonstrate them in
order as in mathematics, because the principles are not known to us in
the same way, and because it would be an endless matter to undertake
it. We must see the matter at once, at one glance, and not by a
process of reasoning, at least to a certain degree. And thus it is
rare that mathematicians are intuitive and that men of intuition are
mathematicians, because mathematicians wish to treat matters of
intuition mathematically and make themselves ridiculous, wishing to
begin with definitions and then with axioms, which is not the way to
proceed in this kind of reasoning. Not that the mind does not do so,
but it does it tacitly, naturally, and without technical rules; for
the expression of it is beyond all men, and only a few can feel it.
Intuitive minds, on the contrary, being thus accustomed to judge at a
single glance, are so astonished when they are presented with
propositions of which they understand nothing, and the way to which is
through definitions and axioms so sterile, and which they are not
accustomed to see thus in detail, that they are repelled and
disheartened.
But dull minds are never either intuitive or mathematical.
Mathematicians who are only mathematicians have exact minds, provided
all things are explained to them by means of definitions and axioms;
otherwise they are inaccurate and insufferable, for they are only
right when the principles are quite clear.
And men of intuition who are only intuitive cannot have the patience
to reach to first principles of things speculative and conceptual,
which they have never seen in the world and which are altogether out
of the common.
2. There are different kinds of right understanding; some have right
understanding in a certain order of things, and not in others, where
they go astray. Some draw conclusions well from a few premises, and
this displays an acute judgment.
Others draw conclusions well where there are many premises.
For example, the former easily learn hydrostatics, where the premises
are few, but the conclusions are so fine that only the greatest
acuteness can reach them.
And in spite of that these persons would perhaps not be great
mathematicians, because mathematics contain a great number of
premises, and there is perhaps a kind of intellect that can search
with ease a few premises to the bottom and cannot in the least
penetrate those matters in which there are many premises.
There are then two kinds of intellect: the one able to penetrate
acutely and deeply into the conclusions of given premises, and this is
the precise intellect; the other able to comprehend a great number of
premises without confusing them, and this is the mathematical
intellect. The one has force and exactness, the other comprehension.
Now the one quality can exist without the other; the intellect can be
strong and narrow, and can also be comprehensive and weak.
3. Those who are accustomed to judge by feeling do not understand the
process of reasoning, for they would understand at first sight and are
not used to seek for principles. And others, on the contrary, who are
accustomed to reason from principles, do not at all understand matters
of feeling, seeking principles and being unable to see at a glance.
4. Mathematics, intuition.--True eloquence makes light of eloquence,
true morality makes light of morality; that is to say, the morality of
the judgement, which has no rules, makes light of the morality of the
intellect.
For it is to judgement that perception belongs, as science belongs to
intellect. Intuition is the part of judgement, mathematics of
intellect.
To make light of philosophy is to be a true philosopher.
5. Those who judge of a work by rule are in regard to others as those
who have a watch are in regard to others. One says, "It is two hours
ago"; the other says, "It is only three-quarters of an hour." I look
at my watch, and say to the one, "You are weary," and to the other,
"Time gallops with you"; for it is only an hour and a half ago, and I
laugh at those who tell me that time goes slowly with me and that I
judge by imagination. They do not know that I judge by my watch.
6. Just as we harm the understanding, we harm the feelings also.
The understanding and the feelings are moulded by intercourse; the
understanding and feelings are corrupted by intercourse. Thus good or
bad society improves or corrupts them. It is, then, all-important to
know how to choose in order to improve and not to corrupt them; and we
cannot make this choice, if they be not already improved and not
corrupted. Thus a circle is formed, and those are fortunate who escape
it.
7. The greater intellect one has, the more originality one finds in
men. Ordinary persons find no difference between men.
8. There are many people who listen to a sermon in the same way as
they listen to vespers.
9. When we wish to correct with advantage and to show another that he
errs, we must notice from what side he views the matter, for on that
side it is usually true, and admit that truth to him, but reveal to
him the side on which it is false. He is satisfied with that, for he
sees that he was not mistaken and that he only failed to see all
sides. Now, no one is offended at not seeing everything; but one does
not like to be mistaken, and that perhaps arises from the fact that
man naturally cannot see everything, and that naturally he cannot err
in the side he looks at, since the perceptions of our senses are
always true.
10. People are generally better persuaded by the reasons which they
have themselves discovered than by those which have come into the mind
of others.
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